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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
LAVAR T.JENSEN,

CaseNo.20020359-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
In this brief, Mr. Jensen offers the following four responses to the State's
arguments. First, Mr. Jensen points out that the State mischaracterizes his evidenceadmissibility argument as a sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument. Further, even if this
was a sufficiency case, Mr. Jensen prevails because the only piece of evidence offered to
show that Mr. Jensen was served with the protective order is inadequate.
Second, Mr. Jensen refutes the State's wholly unsupported argument that
veniremen may be stricken on the basis of a gender-based assumption if that assumption
has some basis in "reason or fact." Appellee's Br. 32.
Third, Mr. Jensen asserts that this is not an appropriate case for the consideration
of whether the dual-motivation analysis should be adopted in this jurisdiction. That
analysis is used only when both neutral and race or gender-based reasons are given for a
strike. But here, the prosecutor gave only one explanation for striking the two veniremen
at issue.

Finally, Mr. Jensen refutes the State's argument that proceeding to trial without a
crucial defense witness was proper. Appellee's Br. 36. This argument is inaccurate
because the witness's appearance may be compelled either through a contempt hearing or
other court powers. So, the trial should have been continued.

ARGUMENT
I. CONTRARY TO THE STATE'S ARGUMENT, IT DID NOT PRESENT
ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE THAT MR. JENSEN WAS SERVED WITH
THE PROTECTIVE ORDER
In its brief, the State misstates Mr. Jensen's argument regarding service of the
protective order. Mr. Jensen does not make a sufficiency of the evidence argument, as the
State claims.1 Instead, Mr. Jensen asserts that the final page of the protective order,
containing an unverified signature along with a short statement about service and an
unidentified address, was inadmissible below. Aplt. Br. 25-28. And, the State has
proffered no other evidence to show that Mr. Jensen was ever served with the protective
order. IcL So, the State did not meet its burden of showing service. Aplt. Br. 15-25, 27-28.
The State, however, phrases this as a sufficiency of the evidence argument,2 and

1

See Appellee's Br. 9 (saying the Mr. Jensen's argument is a sufficiency of the evidence
argument).
2

The State appears to do this in an attempt to have the most stringent standard of review
available, the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard, applied. Appellee's Br. 2, 12-13. Under this
standard, the evidence and all inferences from it must be viewed in the light most favorable to
the jury verdict. State v. Lactod. 761 P.2d 23, 27 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Then, the jury verdict
may be reversed only if the evidence, so viewed, "is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant
2

then argues that the final page of the protective order is sufficient to show that Mr. Jensen
was served. Appellee's Br. 9. The State also argues, as an aside, that the final page is
admissible under the rule of authentication. Appellee's Br. 10. This is because the
protective order was certified. Id So, the State argues, any flaws or inconsistencies in the
signatures or information on the final page are a matter for the jury to weigh. Id. at 10-11.
Mr. Jensen will first address the State's admissibility argument, then he will
address its claim that the final page of the protective order constitutes sufficient evidence
of service.
The State's admissibility argument side-steps the main issue. While it is true that
the certification of the copy of the protective order shows that this copy is precisely the
same as the original on file with the court, it does not show that Mr. Jensen was served
with the protective order.3 Mr. Jensen has never argued that this copy is not the same as

committed the crime of which he was convicted." State v. Widdison. 2000 UT App 185 ^16,4
P.3d 100 (quotations omitted).
However, this is not a sufficiency issue. Any sufficiency issue must be based upon the
inadequacy of substantial, competent, admissible evidence. Car Doctor, Inc. v. Belmont, 635
P.2d 82, 83-84 (Utah 1981); Cutler v. Bowen. 543 P.2d 1349, 1350-52 (Utah 1975). But here,
there was no substantial, competent, admissible evidence at all on the element of whether Mr.
Jensen was served.
The issue is whether thefinalpage of the protective order was inadmissible to show
service. Aplt. Br. 15-28. This means that the standard of review is correctness. Stichting
Mayflower Mountain Fonds v. Jordanelle Special Service Dist. 2001 UT App 257, f7,47 P.3d
86; Reed v. Reed, 806 P.2d 1182, 1184 n.3 (Utah 1991).
3

Of course, a certified copy of a public record does not guarantee that everything in the
record is truthful. It merely indicates that the copy is precisely the same as the one on public
record. See Utah R.Evid. 902(4) (2002) ("Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition
precedent to admissibility is not required with respect to . . . A copy of an official record or
3

the one on file with the court. Mr. Jensen argues that the final page is inadmissible to
show service. The State's misapprehension of this argument underscores its failure below
to meet its burden of showing service.
The final page of the order is inadmissible to show service because the signature is
unverified, the address is unidentified, and there is nothing to show that Mr. Jensen was
actually given a copy of the protective order. Aplt. Br. 25-28; R. 112 [5]. The page is
neither authenticated nor self-authenticated, and so it does not meet the condition
precedent of identification.4
As already explained in the opening brief, identification may be shown by a
certificate of mailing, sheriffs return of service, testimony by the server, signature
notarization, or testimony by a handwriting analyzer. Aplt Br. 26. But none of this was
proffered.
The lay jury in this case could not be expected to know that the signature on the
final page of the protective order is not legally identifiable as Mr. Jensen's signature. This
is why the defense counsel objected to the admission of the final page. The page could,
and did, lead the jury to believe in something which has no foundation.5 Avoiding this
report or entry therein, or of a document authorized by law to be recorded or filed and actually
recorded or filed in a public office ....")
4

Utah R.Evid. 901(a) (2002); Edward Kimball & Ronald Boyce, Utah Evidence Law. 91 (1996).
5

The jury must have believed that thefinalpage showed service because Mr. Jensen was
convicted of the crime, R. 79, and service is an element of the crime, Utah Code Ann. § 30-64.2(3) & (4) (Supp. 2002); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108(1) (1999). Further, no other evidence
was proffered to show service.
4

type of situation is the reason for evidentiary standards in the first place.6
In this case, the State avoided its burden of proving service by proffering the
certified copy of the protective order with the unverified signature and unidentified
address on the last page. This is inappropriate. Certification of a copy of an order should
not take the place of a proper showing of service.
This brings us to the State's argument that there was sufficient evidence in this
case to show service. Appellee's Br. 9, 12-13. This is incorrect. A showing of service is
never made solely by proffering a certified copy of a protective order which does not
show service. To argue that it does is like arguing that a copy of an Information shows
that a defendant has been convicted of the crime, or that a copy of an unwitnessed will
shows the final wishes of a deceased. It is simply not enough.7

6

See Utah R.Evid. 102 (2002) ('These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in
administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and
development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings
justly determined"); see also State v. Schreuder. 726 P.2d 1215, 1231 (Utah 1986) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (rules should not be construed so that loopholes for unreliable evidence are created).
7

With regard to proof of prior crimes, the State must present "competent, relevant
evidence of the other crimes before it can be said that they are proven." State v. Harries, 221
P.2d 605, 623 (Utah 1950) (quotation omitted). In doing this, the State cannot bypass the laws of
evidence, which ensure that there is some minimal standard of reliability to the evidence. Id.
And, if the State presents evidence that is not reliable or which sufficiently connects the
defendant with the prior crime, the evidence is deemed inadmissible and the prior crime element
is not supported. This is because "[s]uch evidence is highly prejudicial to the accused, as it
builds up a tower of culpability . . . which lulls the uninitiated mind into overlooking the fact that
it all may be true, and yet not be connected to the accused." Id, at 625.
With regard to wills, any will that does not qualify as a holographic will must be
witnessed by at least two individuals who sign the will in the testator's presence. Utah Code
Ann. § 75-2-502 (Supp. 2002). See also In re Dong Ling Hing's Estate, 2 P.2d 902 (Utah 1931).
5

Marshaling all of the evidence relevant to service shows that the State did not
prove that Mr. Jensen was served.8 The final page of the protective order, which is the
only evidence that there is to marshal, is insufficient because it is self-conflicting,
contains unverified information, and has an unverified signature.
The page is self-conflicting because of the text. It says, "[b]y this signature,
Respondent approves the form, and accepts service, of this Protective Order and waives
the right to be personally served." R. 112 [5]. It is unclear whether this means that Mr.
Jensen was actually served or that he waived service. Also, the statement below directs
someone to "[s]erve [Respondent at: 6985 So. Pine Mt. Dr. 84121." Id This throws even
further confusion on the question of what was meant to have occurred. If Mr. Jensen had
waived service or accepted service, there would have been no need to order service to
some specific address. Yet, it does. And, there is nothing to show that this occurred. All
of this casts grave doubt on what actually happened, and it cannot support a finding of
service.
Second, the final page has an unidentified address. It is not identified as Mr.
Jensen's work or home address. It is not even identified as being associated with Mr.
Jensen. This flaw alone makes this an insufficient showing of service. Southland Constr.
v. Semnani. 2001 UT 6,12-5, 20 P.3d 875.

8

In sufficiency challenges the challenger "must marshal all evidence supporting the
jury's verdict and [] then show this marshaled evidence is insufficient to support the verdict even
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Vessev, 967 P.2d 960, 966
(Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quotations omitted) (italics in original).
6

Finally, and most importantly, there is nothing to show that the signature on the
page truly is Mr. Jensen's. Even under the stringent sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard,
a signature may not be considered the defendant's just because the State asserts that it is.9
There must be some proof that a signature on a court document belongs to the defendant.
The Utah Supreme Court has even held that properly certified court documents are
inadmissible if they do not have proper signatory information. One example of this is
State v. Lamorie, where the Court ruled that a certified court document not signed by the
court clerk's signature was inadmissible because of the lack of foundation. State v.
Lamone, 610 P.2d 342, 346 (Utah 1980). Similar rulings have been made in states such
as Missouri10 and New York. People v. McGriff, 142 A.2d 934, 936 (NY 1988). These
cases support that there is not enough in this case to show that Mr. Jensen was served
with the protective order.
In sum, the final page of the protective order is inadmissible to show service
because it was not authenticated or self-authenticating. Further, even if it is admissible, it
does not amount to prima facie evidence of service because of the unverified signature,
statement about service, and unidentified address. So, Mr. Jensen's conviction should be
reversed.

9

Utah R.Evid. 902 (2002). See also In re Estate ofKleinman. 970 P.2d 1286, 1290 n.2
(Utah 1998) (Zimmerman, J., dissenting) (must be some extrinsic evidence to identify testator's
handwriting and show the intent of the testator); Gregerson v. Jensen, 617 P.2d 369, 374-75
(Utah 1980) (Hall, J., dissenting) (in contract law, signature must be identified and evidence of
intent proffered).
10

Ibrahim v. Ibrahim. 825 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
7

II. THE STATE'S ARGUMENT THAT GENDER-BASED ASSUMPTIONS
ARE ACCEPTABLE IF THEY HAVE SOME STATISTICAL BASIS IS
WRONG
The State makes the unsupported claim that J.E.B. v. Alabama and the Batson
jurisprudence permits prosecutors to apply gender-based assumptions in striking
venirepersons so long as the assumptions have some basis in "reason or fact." Appellee's
Br. 32. The State goes on to say that the prosecutor's assumption in this case that the
stricken men were perpetrators of domestic violence was acceptable. Id. This is because,
according to an American Bar Association report, most domestic violence perpetrators
are male. Id. at 32-33.
The State's argument contravenes every holding on the issue from this Court, the
Utah Supreme Court, and the United States Supreme Court. As the United States
Supreme Court emphasized in J.E.B. v. Alabama, any assumptions based solely on
gender threaten the "core guarantee of equal protection, [which ensures] citizens that their
State will not discriminate." J.E.B. v. Alabama. 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994) (quotation
omitted). Indeed, that Court directly confronted the argument that gender-based
assumptions are permissible if grounded in statistical evidence. The Court explained that
such assumptions are unusable because, whether they have statistical support or not, they
are superficial and lead to patterns of unjust discrimination:
Even if a measure of truth can be found in some of the gender stereotypes
used to justify gender-based peremptory challenges, that fact alone cannot
support discrimination on the basis of gender injur/ selection. We have
made abundantly clear in past cases that gender classifications that rest on
impermissible stereotypes violate the Equal Protection Clause, even when
8

some statistical support can be conjured up for the generalization. . . . The
Equal Protection Clause, as interpreted by decisions of this Court,
acknowledges that a shred of truth may be contained in some stereotypes,
but requires that state actors look beyond the surface before making
judgments about people that are likely to stigmatize as well as to perpetuate
historical patterns of discrimination.
Id at 139, n.ll.
This holding recognizes that the patterns of discrimination which have caused
great injustice in this country have often been justified on the basis of some scrap of truth
or perception of reality.11 That is why, under J.E.B., statistics alone are not persuasive
authority for accepting a race or gender-based assumption injury selection. Put another
way, "[w]e shall not accept as a defense to gender-based peremptory challenges the very
stereotype the law condemns." J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 138 (quotation omitted).
While J.E.B. emphasized that race or gender-based stereotypes cannot be used, this
has actually been apparent since the issuance of Batson itself. In Batson the United States
Supreme Court emphasized that strikes must be based upon an assessment of the
individual:
Competence to serve as a juror ultimately depends on an assessment of
individual qualifications and ability impartially to consider evidence
presented at a trial. A person's race simply is unrelated to his fitness as a
juror.... As long ago as Strauder, therefore, the Court recognized that by
denying a person participation injury service on account of his race, the
State unconstitutionally discriminated against the excluded juror.
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986) (quotations omitted). The Court later
11

Id at 138-39. See also Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 289-90 (1969)
(recognizing the irony in funneling African Americans into separate, inferior schools, and then
requiring them to take a literacy test to vote).
9

explained that voir dire should be used to gather enough information to allow the parties
to strike jurors on the basis of individual characteristics, not improper assumptions.
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 143. All of this completely extinguishes any idea that gender or racial
stereotypes or assumptions, however based, are acceptable.
Further, this Court recently recognized in State v. Chatwin that the application of
gender-based assumptions is not acceptable in jury selection. This Court said that gender
discrimination is inappropriate when it serves to perpetuate stereotypes "about the relative
abilities of men and women." State v. Chatwin, 2002 UT App 363,1J6, 58 P.3d 867
(citations omitted). Supported wholly by J.E.B. and Batsoii, as well as this State's own
precedent, this Court held that "gender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for juror
competence and impartiality."12
These holdings were addressed specifically to the State's argument in Chatwin that
J.E.B. "forbids the use of gender stereotypes," but it does not forbid the attempt to
eliminate a particular gender from the jury. Chatwin, 2002 UT App 363, ^[15. The State

12

!cL at 1J16 (quotation omitted). This Court was quoting J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129. Also
supporting this Court's holdings was Batson, State v. ColwelL 2000 UT 8,1f 14-22, 994 P.2d 177;
and State v. Shepherd. 1999 UT App 305, f28, 989 P.2d 503.
Notably, race or gender-based assumptions were disapproved in Utah before Chatwin.
For instance, in State v. Pharris this Court recognized that assumptions of jury competency made
on the basis of race could not be used to disqualify a venireperson. State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d
454, 460 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Indeed, this principle has been directly or indirectly
acknowledged in most Utah Batson cases. See e.g. ColwelL 2000 UT 8, Tfl8; State v. Span, 819
P.2d 329, 343 (Utah 1991); State v. Cantu. 778 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah 1989); State v. Cannon.
2002 UT App 18, f 10-11, 41 P.3d 1153; State v. Merrill. 928 P.2d 401, 403 (Utah Ct. App.
1996).
10

acknowledged that J.E.B, forbids the use of gender-based stereotypes. Id. at If 15-18. It
was simply arguing that the prosecutor's attempt to "balance the composition of the jury
to reflect the views of both men and women" by eliminating men was acceptable, h i at
^[18. This Court rejected this, holding that it, like the application of gender-based
stereotypes, was unconstitutional. Id. at ^j 19-20. What is significant for this case is that,
throughout its discussion, this Court as well as the State recognized that gender-based
stereotyping is unconstitutional. Id. at ^15-20.
All in all, the State's argument that the prosecutor's assumption that the stricken
men were perpetrators of domestic violence cannot be supported by statistical data
showing that more men than women commit such assaults. This assumption was gender
discrimination, and a violation of the Equal Protection clause as interpreted by the Batson
jurisprudence.

III. THE ISSUE OF DUAL MOTIVATION IS NOT RIPE FOR REVIEW
The State's argument that this court should adopt the dual motivation analysis is
not ripe for review. That analysis, if applied at all, is applied only when a proponent of a
strike gives both a neutral and a race or gender-based reason for exercising the strike.
State v. Tokars. 95 F.3d 1520, 1533 (11th Cir. 1996). Here, the prosecutor did not do that.
She dismissed the two veniremen at issue only because they "were part of the protective
order," and she assumed "that usually they would be on defendant's side, since more than
likely than not men are the respondents to protective orders . . . . " R. 110 [32]. This does
11

not constitute both a neutral and a race or gender-based reason for the dismissals. This
constitutes only one, gender-based reason for the dismissals. Thus, the issue of dual
motivation is not ripe for review and should not be considered.
The ripeness doctrine developed to prevent the courts from adjudicating issues
prematurely or becoming entangled in legal disagreements that have not actually
occurred. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967) (overruled on
other grounds). Specifically, the doctrine "focuses upon the extent to which the
controversy has matured at the time of litigation." In re Grand Jury, April 1979, 604 F.2d
69, 72 (10th Cir. 1979). Then, it allows courts to adjudicate only those matters which have
sharpened "into an actual or imminent clash of legal rights and obligations . . . . " State v.
Casey, 2002 UT 29, ^[39 n.13, 44 P.3d 756 (quotations omitted).
Two factors play a role in determining whether an issue is ripe for adjudication.
First, the fitness of the issue for judicial decision should be evaluated. Texas v. United
States, 523 U.S. 296, 300-01 (1998). This involves looking at whether the case at hand
presents a concrete context for evaluation of the issue. If the case "involves too remote
and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of the judicial function," the issue should
be postponed. Id at 301 (quotation omitted). This is because an issue is "better grasped
when viewed in light of a particular application," and also because "postponing
consideration of the questions presented, until a more concrete controversy arises . . . has
the advantage of permitting the state courts further opportunity to construe" the issue. Id
(quotations omitted). Second, any hardship to the parties resulting from withholding a
12

decision should be considered. IdL
Taking both factors into account shows that the dual motivation issue is not ripe in
this case. Pertinent to the first factor, there is no concrete context for the evaluation of the
dual motivation issue. The prosecutor gave only one reason for the exclusion of Steven
Smith and Gary Neilson, and that reason was the gender-based assumption that these men
had been respondents in protective orders. R. 110 [32]. So, there was only one motivation
for their dismissals, and the dual motivation analysis wouldn't apply even if it was
accepted in this jurisdiction.
Notwithstanding, the State argues that there were actually two reasons for the
dismissal of these men. The State claims that the prosecutor felt that Mr. Smith was "too
analytical," Appellee's Br. 34, and that Mr. Neilson was stricken "because he was part of
a protective order case." Id. However, these arguments are baseless. Certainly, it is true
that the prosecutor struck one man, Dallas Jolley, in part because he was an engineer and
she wanted someone who was "less analytical."13 However, Mr. Jensen has not taken
issue with Mr. Jolley's dismissal. Aplt. Br. 28-43. Only the dismissals of Mr. Smith and
Mr. Neilson are at issue. Further, the prosecutor did not say that Mr. Smith was stricken
because he was too analytical. R. 110 [32]. She dismissed him only because of her
gender-based assumption.14 The same is true of Mr. Neilson. Id. As the State concedes,

13

R. 110 [32]. Mr. Jolley was stricken also because of the prosecutor's assumption that
he was a respondent to a protective order. Id.
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Id. The State apparently bases its argument that Mr. Smith was too analytical on one
line where the prosecutor says that "it kind of goes along with the next would be finance." Id. at
13

his dismissal was based wholly on his association with a protective order, which the

32-33. However, this one cryptic reference is far from clear, both in meaning and in
identification. Further, even if it does amount to an inference that Mr. Smith was too analytical,
it certainly does not refer to Mr. Neilson. So, this does not provide a basis for applying the dual
motivation analysis. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 95-96 (1986) (recognizing that the
discriminatory dismissal of even one venireperson violates the Equal Protection clause).
This is apparent from the transcript. The transcript reads as follows:
The Court: The natural names we're dealing with here are, juror - let me see, we
have juror 7, which is Mr. Jolley; juror 8, which is Mr. Smith; juror 13, which is
Mr. Neilson. Those are the ones that you have stricken, using your three
peremptory challenges. Is there a reason other than gender why they were struck?
Ms. McKinnon: There certainly was, your Honor. I didn't even initially realize
that all three of them were men, all three of my challenges were men until Mr.
Bautista just pointed it out. I have on my notations that the three struck were part
of the protective order, and logically I assumed that usually they would be on
defendant's side, since more than likely than not men are the respondents to
protective orders, other than women. Those were my reasoning. I also struck - 1
don't have his name here - the first male, because he was an engineer, I - my
reasoning being someone that - 1 would want someone that's less analytical.
The Court: Now, that's Mr. Jolley?
[Ms. McKinnon]: Yes, Mr. Jolley, and it kind of goes along with the next would
be finance. I don't think this is much of a science. I just usually kind of do a
(inaudible) sheet. 1 wasn't looking for men to strike. I left - 1 just went in order of
the ones that were most likely to be called, and I was just looking through that,
and that's why I left Bart Spute on. I was just going through. The next person that
was part of a protective order was - the first ones I have noted is Mr. Jolley. The
one after that, he was part of a protective order. Then the defense struck Ms. Earl.
She was part of a protective order, and then Mr. Neilson, the next one.
The Court: Mr. Bautista, anything you'd like to add to that?
Mr. Bautista: Your Honor, what's interesting is that there were other people, for
example, I believe juror No. 6, Mary Lee, who was before Mr. Jolley, was
involved in domestic violence situations also, and she wasn't stricken - or struck
down.
R. 110 [32-33].
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prosecutor assumed had been responsive. Appellee's Br. 34. So, there is no concrete case
here for the evaluation of the dual motivation analysis, and any judgment on the issue
would be, at best, an abstract, intellectual exercise.
The second factor to consider is whether any hardship would result to the parties if
the dual motivation analysis is not considered. Texas, 523 U.S. at 301. Here, no hardship
would result at all. Nothing in this case depends upon whether this jurisdiction accepts the
dual motivation analysis, because the analysis would not apply in this case even if it was
accepted. This is because there was only one reason, not two, for the prosecutor's
dismissals of Mr. Smith and Mr. Neilson. Further, no anticipated decision-making process
depends upon the consideration of the dual motivation analysis. In some administrative
law cases, agency decisions depend upon declaratory judgments or similar guidelines.
Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 149-50. However, that is not the case here. Here, there is
simply no hardship to the parties.
In sum, the dual motivation issue raised by the State should not be considered
because there is no reason to consider it. This case does not present facts to which the
analysis could be applied, and so whether it is accepted in this jurisdiction is irrelevant to
this case. And, if this issue is considered, the result could negatively affect any future
cases which involve bona fide dual motivation issues.15 So, the issue of dual motivation

15

See Texas, 523 U.S. at 301 (recognizing that adjudicating an issue without concrete
facts to consider requires more "powers of imagination" than is proper to exercise); Grand Jury,
604 F.2d at 72 (recognizing that the changing aspects of controversies affect the ripeness of the
issues).
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should not be considered.

IV. A CRUCIAL WITNESS WHO AVOIDED APPEARANCE AT TRIAL
COULD BE HELD IN CONTEMPT OR SUBJECTED TO OTHER COURT
POWERS
The trial court should have been continued until a crucial witness appeared.
Appellee's Br. 35-36. The State disagrees, however, on the basis that the witness's
attendance could not be assured by the defense. Appellee's Br. 36. The State points out
that it subpoenaed the witness, and she did not appear. And, the defense is not any more
likely to ensure her attendance. Id
However, the State overlooks other actions that could be taken to ensure the
witness's attendance. For one thing, the witness, Jolynne Thomas, has already disobeyed
the State's subpoena and could be found guilty of contempt of court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-32-3 (2002).16 Under that statute, a judge may make a summary finding
of contempt whenever contempt is committed in the court's presence. Id. And, Ms.
Thomas disobeyed the subpoena in the court's presence. R. 110 [48]. This is punishable
by a fine of up to $1,000 or incarceration of up to thirty days. Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-10
(2002). Ms. Thomas may be informed of this. And possibly, she will change her mind
about attending, and will appear at another trial. After all, one of the purposes of the
contempt statutes is to allow the contemner a chance "to purge him- or herself of the

16

Failing to obey a subpoena to appear before the court constitutes contempt. Utah
R.Crim. 14(g) (2002); Von Hake v. Thomas. 759 P.2d 1162, 1168 (Utah 1988).
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contempt by complying with the court's orders." Von Hake, 759 P.2d at 1168.
Secondly, there are other court powers which could be use to compel Ms.
Thomas's attendance. General court orders, material witness warrants,17 or even written
interrogatories or depositions could be used to obtain Ms. Thomas's testimony in this
case.18 The use of such procedures would be proper because, under article I, section 12 of
the Utah Constitution, criminal defendants are guaranteed the right "to have compulsory
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf...." UT Const, art. I,
§12.
In sum, the State's argument that Mr. Jensen would not be any more successful
than the State at ensuring Ms. Thomas's presence at trial is incorrect. At least two
methods are available to encourage her attendance, and neither of them have been tried.
So, the trial court should have granted the defense's motion for a continuance to allow
time for Ms. Thomas to appear.

17

See Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-2 (Supp. 2002) (Under this section the State often
compels a witness to give testimony either in court or in another setting when the witness has
some reluctance to testify. This procedure could also be used by the defense for a crucial
witness).
18

Interrogatories could be used at least to obtain information about Ms. Thomas's
testimony, Utah R.Civ. 30-33 (2002), and possibly even at submitted at trial. See Utah R.Evid.
803 (5) (2002) (recorded recollections are exceptions to the hearsay rule); Utah R.Crim. 16
(2002) (prosecutor must disclose evidence which on good cause shown should be made available
to the defendant).
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CONCLUSION
In light of the above, Mr. Jensen respectfully asks this Court to reverse his
conviction on the grounds that the State failed to show that he was properly served with
the protective order he is accused of violating. Alternatively, Mr. Jensen asks this Court
to reverse his conviction and remand this case for a new trial either because: 1) the
prosecutor sexually discriminated against two veniremen during jury selection, or 2) the
trial court's denial of Mr. Jensen's motion for a continuance was a harmful abuse of
discretion.
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